Declassification on 9/11 Anniversary
On Friday, the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the CIA declassified several dozen presidential daily briefs concerning Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. These highly classified briefings, prepared for the nation's top leaders, span from February 1998 to September 12, 2001. CIA Director John Ratcliffe called the release an act of exceptional transparency and the agency's largest single disclosure of such documents. The briefs detail intelligence on bin Laden's movements, support network, and threats to US targets, including his operations' financing. Many documents were redacted to protect source identities.[S1][S2][S3]
Key Warnings and Intelligence Gaps
According to the released files, intelligence officials issued multiple alerts regarding what bin Laden intended to do. A briefing from July 1998 judged it credible that he ranked striking America highly and was drawn to chemical and biological weapons. By September of that year, an analyst wrote that bin Laden favored hitting the US within its own borders, specifically Washington, and that al-Qaida could send a plane loaded with explosives into an American city. A December 1998 briefing covered possible hijackings, noting that plotters had slipped past security during a test at a New York airport and that certain members had undergone hijack instruction. An August 2001 briefing cited activity suggesting hijack preparations, such as casing federal buildings in New York, and said the FBI had roughly 70 full field investigations tied to bin Laden.[S1][S3]
Further documents follow bin Laden's efforts to obtain dirty-bomb components and his trials with biological weapons. An April 1998 paper explained that the Taliban would not surrender him, regarding him as a guest and feeling indebted for the help he gave during the Soviet occupation. A report issued one month before the attacks stated that bin Laden was determined to carry out terrorism on American soil, pointing out that the 1998 embassy bombings proved he readies operations long in advance and keeps going despite reversals. The briefings also indicate that by June 1999 his operatives had tested explosives in order to boost their power.[S1][S2]
Context and Reactions
For the most part, the material confirms what the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States had already concluded; its 2004 report faulted agencies including the CIA and FBI for failing to share information. Steps born of the commission's proposals created roles such as a single director of national intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center. The White House pointed as well to a Friday release by the National Archives containing interviews with national security officials from the Clinton and Bush years, produced by the commission that examined the attacks between 2002 and 2004. On how the attacks were planned, the documents seem to offer nothing new.[S1][S2][S3]
