You ask whether to send your soldiers into a distant war, and you answer that you will not. I would look first to what such a decision is worth. A prince who declares himself openly in favor of one side gains a bond with the victor; but a prince who takes the neutral path to avoid present danger is generally ruined, for he is neither thanked nor protected. Yet there is a second consideration: a prince ought never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, because if he conquers he is at that power's discretion, and a prince ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. So the question is not whether to fight, but with whom, and on what terms.
I would also observe that your strength in this matter is not the same as your willingness. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow place, and I have written that many men cannot be assembled in such strong places for their defense, partly because a large number cannot long subsist there, and partly because such places, being narrow and confined, afford room for a few only. If you commit your forces to hold a passage you cannot hold in force, and you lose it, there commonly follows such panic among your people and among the troops which remain to you that you are vanquished without opportunity given for any display of valor, and lose everything without bringing all your resources into play. A role that stops short of troops may be the wiser course, but only if you are honest about what you can actually defend.
Finally, I would caution you against threatening and asking at the same time. It is enough to ask another for his weapons, without adding, "With these I purpose to destroy you;" for when once you have secured his weapons, you can use them afterwards as you please. If you wish to keep your principle of not deploying troops, keep it quietly and let your actions speak. A state that announces its limits too loudly invites others to test them.
